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Abstract
We analyze a political agency model in which the voters can only observe the type of
the incumbent through the signals published by the media outlets. The incumbent may offer
transfers to media outlets in order for them to suppress the news about him. When not every
outlet is captured, the voters who follow the informative outlet may choose to spread the news
via social media in a global game setting. We show that this model has a unique equilibrium
in which press freedom and voter welfare are in general increasing in social connectedness
(which we define as a combination of internet usage rate and social capital). The exceptions
arise when an incumbent who would otherwise only capture some media outlets is forced
by the risk of news spreading via social media to capture all of them. We then examine a
dataset that includes indices of press freedom and corruption for 172 countries to test our
hypotheses.
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SOSYAL MEDYANIN BASIN ÖZGÜRLÜ ˘GÜ VE HESAP SORULAB˙IL˙IRL˙IK
ÜZER˙INDE ETK˙ILER˙I
Korhan KOÇAK
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014
Tez Danıs¸manı: Özgür KIBRIS
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Özet
Bu tezde, seçmenlerin hâlihazırda görevde olan iktidatın tipini ancak basın tarafından
yayınlanan sinyaller aracıyla gözlemleyebildig˘i bir model incelenmektedir. Görevdeki ikti-
dar, basın organlarına kendisi hakkındaki haberleri gizli tutmaları için transferler teklif ede-
bilir. Bu teklifleri kabul etmeyen basın organları varsa, bu organları takip eden ve böylece
iktidarın tipinden haberdar olan seçmenler sosyal medyayı kullanarak bu bilgiyi yaymaya
çalıs¸abilir. Bu modelin bir tek dengesi oldug˘unu ve bu dengede basın özgürlüg˘ü ve seç-
men refahının (internet kullanımı ve sosyal sermayenin bir kombinasyonu olarak tanım-
ladıg˘ımız) sosyal bag˘lanmıs¸lık ile genellikle dog˘rudan ilis¸kili oldug˘unu gösteriyoruz. ˙Is-
tisnalar, kısmi basın özgürlüg˘ü olan durumlarda iktidarın sosyal medya tehdidinden dolayı
basının tamamını susturmaya gerek duymasından kaynaklanıyor. Teorik bulgularımızı daha
sonra 172 ülkeden olus¸an bir veri kümesi aracılıg˘ıyla empirik olarak test ediyoruz.
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1 Introduction
June 2013 in Turkey was marked with violent clashes between the police and protesters who
were trying to prevent the demolition of a small park in the heart of Istanbul, known as Gezi
Park. Many aspects of the events, such as the socio-economic diversity of the protesters,
involvement of the very popular soccer fan clubs, the government’s response to the protests,
or the amount of violence used by the riot police, were worth mention (and occupied head-
lines and columns in the international media; e.g. see Arango and Yeginsu, 2013). But,
the way the Turkish mainstream media ignored the events took center stage instead. For
example, while CNN International was broadcasting the hundreds of thousands of protesters
under brutal teargas and water cannon attacks by the police, CNN’s Turkish version, CNN
Türk, was broadcasting a documentary about penguins. One channel was showing a beauty
pageant, yet another a gourmet program about ethnic food. The state of the mainstream me-
dia, the TV channels, the newspapers and their websites, was scandalous throughout the first
few days of the protests. What brief coverage they did was mostly focused on the vandalism
committed by the protesters, with little or no mention of the excessive use of police force
(Turgut, 2013). The most accurate and extensive coverage of the events took place in social
media,1 and a few alternative media outlets whose anti-government stances were well estab-
lished. People utilized social media to alert fellow citizens about the existence of a few small
TV stations and newspapers which reported the events more reliably than the mainstream
media, channeling people to these sources for information. A good example is Halk TV, a
small TV station that belongs to the main opposition party, CHP. During the Gezi protests, a
great many references were made in the social media to its live feeds from the protests, and
the small channel first became a Trending Topic in the evening of May 31st, 2013, increasing
its ratings from a mere 0.453% to 1.308%, an almost threefold increase within a few days.
Similarly, the anti-government daily Sözcü, which was the fourth most popular newspaper
in Turkey at the time, saw a 21 percent increase in sales during the week following the start
of the protests.
A brief exploration of the Turkish media yields why some outlets appear to be free to pro-
duce whatever news they wish, whereas most others choose to ignore what seem to be very
significant historical events. Like Halk TV, the newspaper Sözcü is universally acknowl-
edged to be extremely anti-government, and very much pro-CHP. Many of its editors moved
to Sözcü after they were fired from their previous outlets, allegedly due to government pres-
1According to data by NYU Social Media and Political Participation laboratory, during the first three days
of the protests, 10 million tweets had been sent that included the most popular hashtags such as #occupygezi
(Fitzpatrick, 2013).
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sure. Similarly, a huge portion of Sözcü’s audience switched to the anti-government daily
after their previous newspapers changed their stances to accomodate the incumbent prime
minister Erdog˘an’s government. Eventually Sözcü became a haven for the disillusioned Ke-
malists in an increasingly polarized society. It should be no surprise that Sözcü sold an
average of 363.057 copies in the last week of June 2013, soon after the protests erupted, a
sixfold increase after its initial debut in June 2007 when it only sold an average 61.183 copies
on its first week. (Medyatava, 2007) Not only is the audience of Sözcü utterly opposed to
Erdog˘an and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), its staunch adherence to old Kemal-
ist principles makes it unlikely to ever appeal to the Islamists and the liberals of the country.
The following excerpt from the Freedom House’s Special Report on Turkey, published in
February 2014, summarizes the situation:
[D]espite being among the country’s highest-circulating dailies, Sözcü only
reaches the substantial minority already predisposed to its secularist Kemalist
views, which would never vote for the AK Party. It is not a government target.
(Freedom House, 2014)
This is in contrast to the more mainstream media outlets in Turkey, who used to bear
some resemblance of unbiased journalism until very recently. These outlets have a relatively
milder tone, and they are much less extreme, regardless of whether they are pro- or anti-
government. Among them are the TV channels NTV, Kanal D, ATV, Haber Türk, Show TV
and CNN Türk, as well as a number of very popular newspapers:
There is also a group of newspapers considered “mainstream,” meaning that
despite their political legacies they can reach an audience beyond the true believ-
ers of one ideological group. These papers include Hürriyet (409,000), Milliyet
(168,000), Sabah (319,000), and Aks¸am (103,000). A key aspect of the govern-
ment’s efforts to control the media has been to focus most of its attention and
pressure on these “mainstream” outlets. (Freedom House, 2014)
The AKP government chose to accomodate both extreme pro-government and extreme
anti-government media outlets, and focused its efforts almost exclusively on the mainstream
outlets that reached a much broader audience. How they managed to do that, of course, is
another very important question.
Audience related revenues for media outlets are limited in Turkey, and it is understood
that often the owners of media outlets are in this business so that they have a means to show
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their loyalty to the government in charge, in the hopes that the favor will be returned. The
Privatization High Council (Ö˙IB), which gives the privatization approvals; and the Housing
Development Administration (TOK˙I), which distributes billions of dollars each year through
construction contracts, as well as others, are run by the prime minister’s office. Given that the
prime minister has the final say on many lucrative business contracts, it is hardly surprising
to see anti-government protests in Turkey make headlines anywhere but Turkey.
A remark heard frequently during Freedom House’s investigations is that
many owners of powerful holding companies regard media properties as a bur-
den rather than a privilege—a levy that must be paid to ensure continued ac-
cess to government contracts. An increasingly common phenomenon is a game
of “pass the can,” where holding companies bear the cost of running a pro-
government media group for a time and then try to transfer ownership to another
beneficiary of government favor as quickly as circumstances allow. (Freedom
House, 2014)
It should be no surprise that the citizens of Turkey started depending on the internet, in
particular the social media, to receive news about their country. This is indeed what happened
increasingly, as one report shows that average daily time spent on the internet increased by 50
percent between 2011 and 2013. Meanwhile the time spent on TV and newspaper decreased
by 11 percent (eMarketer, 2013). Furthermore, Turkey is a close contender to the top spot
in rankings of countries with the highest penetration rate of popular social media websites,
most notably Facebook and Twitter.
The recent proliferation of social media slowly but surely alters the way people receive
and share news across the globe. A Eurovision study published in February 2013 claims that
43% of young people surveyed find their news via social media instead of search engines
(Hahn, 2013). Another report by the Pew Internet Center published in November 2012
found that 30% of the registered voters in the USA had been encouraged to vote for either
the Democrat or the Republican candidate in the 2012 presidential elections by family and
friends via posts on social media (Rainie, 2012). Moreover, social media has been central
throughout the Arab Spring. Evidence shows that protesters across Middle East and North
Africa utilized social media to disseminate information regarding the incumbent as well as
organizing rallies and demonstrations (Howard et al., 2011).2
It appears that politicians have caught up with this trend. In many countries, including
Iran, Bahrain, Oman and Belarus social media users have been jailed or arrested for posts
2One example is a video showing Tunis’ ex president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s wife using a government
jet to make expensive shopping trips to Europe.
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critical of the government. Turkey’s prime minister, as a response to the wide-spread use
of Twitter during the June 2013 protests, called it a "menace to society" (Freedom House,
2013a). Soon after, a famous Turkish actor, Memet Ali Alabora, was personally targeted by
pro-government media outlets for a tweet he sent before the popular spread of the protests.
In Vietnam, a law came into effect in September 2013 that makes it illegal to post and share
information gathered from press organizations to social media (Greenhouse, 2013). Accord-
ing to the Freedom on the Net report published by the Freedom House in October 2013,
22 of the 60 governments examined in the study found evidence of hired pro-government
commentators to manipulate online discussions.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical analysis of the effects of social media on the gov-
ernment’s capture of the media industry, and thus, on government accountability and political
competition. We construct and analyze a game theoretical model of political competition,
the main actors of which are (i) an incumbent politician whose type (e.g. corrupt or clean)
is unobservable, (ii) mainstream and alternative media outlets (e.g. CNN Türk and Halk TV
in the above example), and (iii) two groups of voters, each following one of the two types
of media outlets.
Our model extends that of a seminal paper by Besley and Prat (2006), a canonical po-
litical agency model (a la Barro, 1973 and Ferejohn, 1986) where information about the
government is provided endogenously by the media industry. Besley and Prat analyze a
Bayesian game where there is an incumbent who is either bad or good, whose type may be
observed by the media, but cannot be observed by the voters directly. A bad incumbent in
this setting chooses whether to make transfers to media outlets in return of them suppressing
information about their type. At the final stage of the game, voters observe the (possibly
biased) media news and after updating their beliefs regarding the politican’s type, choose to
vote for the incumbent or a challenger of unknown type. The tractability of this model, as
well as the consistency of its predictions with empirical data (see Prat and Stromberg, 2011)
made it very popular.3
We extend Besley and Prat (2006) to introduce the possibility that “informed voters”
might use the social media to alert others about sources (e.g. the alternative media) that
reveal the incumbent’s true type. This complicates the analysis since, while a single informed
voter cannot do much to inform the society, a great many informed voters revealing the same
information has a much larger effect. Thus, the social media interaction among the informed
3Using this model, Besley and Prat (2006) discuss how and when government captures media and what
effect this has on political outcomes. Their main results are (i) media pluralism provides effective protection
against capture, (ii) independent ownership (i.e. the difficulty with which the state is able to transfer resources
to the media) reduces capture, and (iii) media capture affects political outcomes.
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voters creates a coordination game where payoffs from using the social media depend on
how many other informed voters are doing it.
We argue that an important parameter in determining the outcome of the social media
interaction is the “level of connectedness” in a country. We take the level of connectedness
to be a measure of both technological and economic variables (such as the amount of internet
penetration, social media usage rates, prevalence of mobile devices or other telecommuni-
cation technologies) as well as sociological ones (such as social capital or political trust).
Improvements in access to communication technologies as well as the extent to which infor-
mation shared through such technologies disseminates to the rest of the society increases the
level of connectedness in a country.
Our results show that an increase in connectedness of a country serves to bring in line
the amount of information shared by the mainstream and the alternative media. Either, an
increase in connectedness frees the mainstream media, thus making all media outlets sharing
relevant information with the public. Or it leads the government to capture the alternative
media outlets beside the mainstream media, thus preventing dissemination of information in
the country. These results predict that, as the world becomes more connected, we should
observe an increase in the number of countries with free media; but among those countries
that still have captured media, we should observe more media outlets captured.
We test our results empirically and find that our hypotheses are supported by a cross-
country data set of 172 countries. Using internet penetration rate as a proxy for connected-
ness, our study of the data reveals that countries with greater connectedness on average have
significantly greater press freedom. However, these countries also have significantly greater
cross-country variance, suggesting that increased connectedness may lead governments to
further suppress media freedom in high rent countries.
In the theoretical part of our model, the coordination game where the voters who learned
the incumbent’s true type choose to share this information or not is modeled as a global
game.4 In that part, we assume that the informed voters derive utility from sharing per se,
which depends on how many people their messages reach, that is to say, how connected the
society is. This assumption is not necessary for our findings, and in the appendix we examine
an extension with an alternative payoff structure and show that our results still hold.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we examine the related liter-
ature, in section 3 we present the game and find its equilibria, in section 4 we evaluate our
findings empirically, and section 5 concludes the paper. Finally, the appendix presents an
4See Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998, 2001).
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extension of our baseline model.
2 Literature Review
This paper is intended to contribute to the recent literature on the question of media bias
and how it relates to politics. There have been various attempts to explain why media bias
exists. Baron (2004) examines a model where media bias is rooted in the supply side. In
their setting, media outlets have the option to hire journalists for lower wages if they allow
them to publish biased news, who might prefer to slant the news if this may help them further
their careers. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005), on the other hand, focus on the demand side.
They argue that if customers believe that the quality of a news report is proportional to how
well it conforms with their prior expectations, then media outlets will have an incentive
to slant the news towards their audience’s priors to build a reputation of high quality. In
a behavioral model, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) assume that customers derive utility
from consuming news that confirm their beliefs. Besley and Prat (2006) focus instead on the
political side of press freedom, and examine a model where the head of state in a democratic
setting can make transfers to media outlets in order to suppress a bad signal they may have
about her.
Edmond (2013) examines a noisy signalling model in which the incumbent can take a
costly action that manipulates the information provided by the media outlets in order to dis-
courage dissent. Employing a global game framework, he finds that the proliferation of new
information technologies has offsetting effects on a bad regime’s chances of survival. On the
downside, a greater number of media outlets that a regime may manipulate leads to public
opinion becoming more precise, and in this case coordination on status quo can be induced
relatively easily. However, this also means that the costly action the incumbent may take
is now more costly, simply because there are more outlets to capture. Edmond argues that
unless there are strong economies of scale in information control (e.g. radio propaganda
in Nazi Germany) an increase in the number of signals makes the regime easier to over-
throw. The main question of that paper is how an incumbent can utilize manipulation to fake
strength and therefore discourage attacks by citizens who know that the incumbent is bad.
The theoretical findings are then evaluated under different media structures. In this sense,
mass media and social media are interpreted as substitutes in Edmond’s paper. In contrast,
they are complements in our model, and we study how information that the incumbent is bad
may leak in an electoral system.
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3 The Model
In this section, we introduce a two-period retrospective voting model a la Barro (1973),
Ferejohn (1983), and Besley and Prat (2006). Technically, our model is a Bayesian game
involving (i) an incumbent politician, I, whose type (good or bad) is unobservable, (ii)
mainstream and the alternative media outlets M and A (e.g. CNN Türk and Halk Tv in the
above example), and (iii) a set V of voters, divided into two groups as (a) followers of
the mainstream media (mainstream voters, VM) and (b) followers of the alternative media
(alternative voters, VA).
In the first period, an incumbent is exogenously in power whose type space is  2 fb; gg,
where b stands for "bad" and g stands for "good". An incumbent is good with probability ,
and bad with probability 1  . A good incumbent yields a payoff of one to voters, whereas
a bad incumbent generates zero payoff. The voters cannot observe their payoffs at the end of
the first period, which is the time for election.
For simplicity, we assume that there are two media outlets. We call them M (for main-
stream) and A (for alternative).5 We denote by i the audience share of outlet i. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the audience share of the mainstream outlet is strictly
larger than the audience share of the alternative outlet. That is to say, M > A. The media
outlets are identical in their strategy sets and preferences. They have two types of profit, au-
dience related and policy related. The former includes subscription fees and advertisements
etc. whereas the latter may be in the form of direct bribes from the incumbent, or favorable
policies for the groups or individuals associated with the outlet.
Media outlets observe no signal if the incumbent is good. However, a bad incumbent is
revealed with probability q 2 (0; 1) to both media outlets, and with probability 1  q its type
remains hidden. If an outlet receives no signal, then we say that they have no informative
news and their payoff is normalized to zero. If they observe the bad signal, on the other
hand, they can either publish it for the audience related profit of i for i 2 fM;Ag; or they
can suppress the bad signal in exchange for a transfer ti from the incumbent, which yields a
profit of ti to outlet i.
The transfers are offered by the incumbent in exchange for the suppression of bad news
about them, after the incumbent observes whether the verifiable signal is received by the
media outlets. The offers to both outlets are made simultaneously, and are unobserved by
5One may extend on this assumption and think of M and A as two distinct groups of jointly owned several
media outlets. In fact, one can further extend to think of M and A as any partition of the set of media outlets
into two.
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the voters. Reelection yields a profit of r > 0 to both types of incumbents. Thus the payoff
of the incumbent is r  Pi2I ti if the incumbent is reelected, and  Pi2I ti if they are not,
where I is the set of media outlets who accept the offer.6
Next, the voters observe the signals reported by the media outlets they follow. Voters
who observed s = b also observe whether the other media outlet published or suppressed the
signal. If one of the media outlets accept the offer whereas the other does not, the followers
of the informative outlet (informed voters, or IV) play what we call a social media game to
pass on the signal to the audience of the other outlet. How likely the uninformed voters are to
be convinced depends on both the ratio of IV who choose to share the information on social
media, and how connected the society is. If both outlets accept the offer, or if both reject, the
game moves on to the next stage automatically. At the final stage of the game, voters vote
for the incumbent or a challenger of unknown type.
We will examine the details of the model in the following subsections. Part 3.1 examines
the Social Media Game, the global game played by the informed voters. Part 3.2 focuses on
the Media Game, and Part 3.3 finds the equilibria of the game.
3.1 Social Media Game
The social media game is a global game played by the informed voters (IV) who have ob-
tained the information that the incumbent is bad. Upon receiving this verifiable signal, IV can
use the social media to propagate this information. If they succeed, the uninformed voters
switch to the informative outlet and thus receive the verifiable signal about the incumbent’s
type. If they fail, the uninformed voters stay uninformed and the status quo remains.
Whether uninformed voters receive the bad signal from the IV depends on two factors.
First, the ratio of the IV who share the bad signal via social media, denoted by  2 [0; 1]
increases this likelihood. The second factor we call connectedness, denoted by  2 R. We
use the term to refer to both observable and unobservable measures of connectedness among
members in a society. Observable measures include internet penetration and social media
usage rates, as well as prevalence of mobile phones and other communication technologies.
Unobservable measures refer to sociological concepts such as social capital or political trust,
for example, to what extent an individual is open to what others have to say, or how likely
one’s opinions, especially those with political content, are to reach others. The extent of
social capital in a society may be roughly estimated by individuals in that society, however,
6The assumption that good and bad type incumbents receive the same rent is not restrictive in our setting,
because a good incumbent never offers positive transfers to either media outlet in any equilibrium.
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since each individual’s interactions are limited to a subset of the society, and social capital
is not precisely quantifiable, each individual has an imperfect information about it. Another
way to think of social capital is that it may be the inverse of misinformation present within
communication channels. For example, a citizen in a society where there is strong trust
among individuals may be easier to convince by other citizens relative to a similar individual
in a society abundant in conspiracy theories or propaganda.
We assume that the voters’ prior expectations of , the connectedness parameter, are
normally distributed with mean  and precision  (variance 1=). Once it is realized, the
actual value of connectedness, , is observed by the incumbent and the media outlets. How-
ever, a voter i only receives a signal of the form xi =  + i, where i is a random draw
from a normal distribution with mean zero and precision . Conditional on , the signals
are independent and identically distributed across voters. An intuitive way to think about 
is that the observable measures of connectedness such as internet penetration rate are com-
mon knowledge. These observables would then correspond to  the prior expectation of .
After interacting with others in their networks, people use the Bayes’ rule to update their
beliefs regarding social capital in the overall society, which correspond to the error terms.
The posterior expectation i of an IV i who received signal xi is given by (DeGroot 1970):
i =
+ xi
+ 
Furthermore, the precision of the posterior expectation is equal to + .
Given the level of social connectedness, ; and the ratio of IV who share the news about
the bad signal,  2 [0; 1]; the probability that the uninformed voters learn the incumbent’s
true type is given by the function p(; ). It is continuous and non-decreasing in both  and
 with p(; 0) = 0 for any . This means that if no one shares the bad signal about the
incumbent, the audience of M cannot learn the true type of the incumbent regardless of how
well the society is connected. If the signal is shared by a sufficient ratio of informed voters,
on the other hand, the incumbent is overturned with probability p(; ), and with probability
, the challenger who replaces the incumbent is good and yields a payoff of one to voters.
Therefore, all informed voters receive the expected utility p(; ), regardless of whether
they choose to share or not.
There is a cost associated with sharing the news of the bad signal about the incumbent,
given by the expression c(1 )+. The first part is in the form of punishment, such as fines
or imprisonment. It is decreasing in the ratio of IV who share the news, and is multiplied by
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a non-negative constant c which is a measure of the severity of the punishment depending
on laws and regulations related to social media use. The latter part is a strictly positive and
arbitrarily small fixed cost associated with time and effort spent on sharing the news. For
example,  may be the opportunity cost of the time consumed while composing a political
blog, a Facebook post or a tweet.
There is also a benefit that informed voters derive from sharing information via social
media, which is given by the linear function:
b() = 
This benefit may be in the form of material gain when the media in question is in the
form of a political blog, where more clicks correspond to larger advertisement revenue for
the owner. It may also be in the form of immaterial gain in the form of interactions for social
media (e.g. "likes" and "comments" for Facebook or "favorites" and "retweets" for Twitter)
. We assume that when connectedness increases, an informed voter is able to reach a greater
audience, and therefore derives a larger utility.
Within the social media game, the payoff of an IV who shares the information, as a
function of  and  is then:
 + p(; )   c(1  )  
On the other hand, the expected payoff of an IV who refrains from sharing is:
p(; )
Then, the utility gain of sharing for an IV is7:
   c(1  )  
There are three intervals in which we can examine the best responses of the informed
voters:
7Implicit in this setup is the assumption that the informed voters who share the signal on social media incur
the costs of sharing regardless of the outcome of the elections. This is for purposes of simplicity and the model
can easily be extended to accomodate costs that are dependent on the whether the bad incumbent stays in power
or not.
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 When  2 ( 1; ), refraining is a strictly dominant action for every informed voter,
since the benefit of sharing is always lower than its cost, regardless of the actions of
other IV.
 When  2 [; ( + c)], neither strategy is strictly dominant. Hence the equilibrium
depends on players’ beliefs about both the actual value of connectedness, and what the
other players will do. The benefit of sharing is then characterized by   b()  c+ 
(strictly if  2 (; ( + c))). 8
 When  2 (( + c);1), sharing is a strictly dominant action for every informed voter,
since the benefit of sharing is always greater than its cost, regardless of the actions of
other IV.
A pure strategy for an IV is a function specifying an action for each possible posterior,
that is to say, si(i) 2 f0; 1g for all i: Note that, for any informed voter the expected utility
gain of sharing increases as their posterior expectation of connectedness goes up, holding
 constant. Then, as  increases we would expect that the likelihood that any informed
voter shares the news on social media should not decrease. Hence, it is natural to think of a
strategy profile where each informed voter chooses to share when their posterior expectation
of connectedness is higher than a cutoff , and refrain when it is lower.
When every informed voter uses such a cutoff strategy, since their preferences are iden-
tical, their cutoff points must be equal as well. We will show below this is indeed the case,
and that such a strategy profile is the only profile that survives iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. Consider an IV whose posterior expectation is exactly equal to , the
cutoff point. For her to use  as the cutoff rule, she must be indifferent between sharing and
refraining. This holds true only when the expected benefit of sharing equals the expected
cost of sharing, i.e. i = c(1   ) + . For a voter whose posterior on  is , the expected
benefit of sharing is equal to b() = . To see whether this equals to c(1   ) + , we
must first calculate the expected proportion of IV who share the information conditional on
the posterior expectation . Note that the proportion of IV who choose to share is equal to
the probability that any single individual shares. Since each IV uses  as the cutoff rule,
the probability that any one of them shares is equal to the probability that she has a posterior
greater than .
Given i, voter i believes that  is distributed normally with mean i and precision +.
She also believes that voter j has posterior:
8If there was perfect information on , there would be two self-fulfilling equilibria at  = 0 and at  = 1.
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j =
+ xj
+ 
where xj = + j . Voter i’s expectation of xj is then normally distributed with mean i,
and variance 1
+
+ 1

. Therefore, the precision is given by:
1
1
+
+ 1

=
(+ )
+ 2
Hence we follow Morris and Shin (2001) and write:
j > i ,
+ xj
+ 
> i , xj > i +


(i   )
Therefore, voter i believes that voter j has a posterior expectation j greater than i with
probability:
1  
0@s(+ )
+ 2
 
i +


(i   )  i
!1A = 1  
0@

s
(+ )
+ 2
(i   )
1A
where  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
Defining  = 
2(+ )
(+ 2)
we can rewrite the cdf above as:
1   (p(i   ))
The probability that any informed voter j has a posterior greater than  is equal to the
proportion of informed voters who have posteriors above the threshold. Then, the equilib-
rium cutoff  must satisfy the equality:
b() = c (1  (1   (p(   )))) + 
Therefore we have:
 = c (
p
(   )) + 
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Both sides of the above equation are increasing in . For there to be a unique cutoff point
where the IV choose to share if and only if their posterior is greater than that cutoff point,
the two sides of the above equation must cross exactly once. As standard in the literature, to
ensure that the two sides cross only once, we assume that the slope of the right hand side is
always lower than 1, the slope of b(). The upper bound of the slope of the cdf is given byq
=2, hence we set the upper bound of the slope of the right hand side equal to c
q
=2.
Proposition 1 When  < 2
c2
, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
every IV shares the information if and only if their posterior  > , where  is the unique
solution to:
 = c
p
(   )

+ 
Proof. Denote by u(; ^) the expected utility of an informed voter with the posterior expec-
tation  who shares, when all other informed voters use the cutoff ^: Conditional on  the
expected proportion of informed voters who refrain is equal to:

 p

 
^+


(^  )  
!!
= 
 r
(+)
(+2)
 
^  + 

(^  )
!!
Hence:
u(; ^) = b()  c
 r
(+)
(+2)
 
^  + 

(^  )
!!
  
If   ; sharing is weakly dominated, regardless of the actions of the other IV. Let
1 = . Then, any IV with   1 will refrain9. This gives us the first round of elimination
of dominated strategies for low values of . Since all informed voters know this, they realize
that when others have posteriors lower than 1 they will never share. If everyone who has
posteriors lower than 1 refrain, sharing can never be optimal for an IV whose posterior is
lower than 2, where 2 solves:
u(2; 1) = 0
The above equality implies that 2 is also the best response threshold strategy to 1.
Furthermore, since u(:; :) is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second, we
know that 2  1. Due to 2  1 and the fact that payoffs are symmetric, the proportion of
IV who refrain is higher than that implied by the cutoff strategy at 1. The expected utility of
sharing decreases in the expected proportion of IV who refrain, hence for any value  < 2,
9The equality part follows from our assumption that voters use undominated strategies.
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sharing is dominated. This gives us the second round of elimination of dominated strategies
for low values of . By iterating, we have a sequence:
1  2  :::  k  :::
where sharing is eliminated for values of posterior  < k in period k of iterated elimi-
nation of dominated strategies. The smallest posterior m which solves u(m; m) = 0 is the
least upper bound of this sequence.
A symmetric argument from the other side, that is to say, for high values of , establishes
a similar sequence:
1  2  :::  k  :::
where refraining is eliminated for values of posterior  > k in period k of iterated
elimination of dominated strategies. The largest posterior m which solves u(m; m) = 0 is
the greatest lower bound of this sequence.
Finally, our premise   2
c2
ensures that there is a unique value of  such that u(; ) =
0, and therefore m = m, which concludes our proof.
We know that an informed voter with signal xi has the posterior:
i =
+ xi
+ 
We also know that she will share if and only if i >  which satisfies the equality in
Proposition 2. Then an informed voter shares if and only if xi >  +


(   ). Since xi
are distributed with mean  and precision , from the incumbent’s perspective the proportion
of informed voters who share is given by:
1  
 p

 
 +


(   )  
!!
Let us denote by () the proportion of IV who share when connectedness level is given
by . The incumbent and the media outlets observe the level of connectedness perfectly and
hence believe that the probability of overturn is only a function of the underlying state of
the world. Hence, we suppress () and denote by p() the probability of overturn when
connectedness is  and fraction () of informed voters share the signal.
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3.2 Media Game
When the mainstream media outlet publishes the bad signal, it receives:
UM(publish) = M
So M’s product is consumed by its own audience, and its payoff is the size of the audience
regardless of what A does. When M suppresses the signal in exchange for a transfer by the
incumbent, it receives:
UM(suppress) = tM
The payoff of A depends not only on its own action, but also on whether M chooses to
publish or not. When both publish, A only reaches its own audience. When M suppresses,
however, with probability p() the audience of M is convinced by the informed voters via
social media that A contains important news. In this case the audience of M switch to A and
therefore the expected payoff of the alternative outlet increases10:
EUA(publish) =
8<: A;A + p()M ;
if M publishes
if M suppresses
When A suppresses, its payoff is the transfer proposed by the incumbent:
UA(suppress) = tA
The incumbent receives payoff r from reelection, and when I  fM;Ag accept the
transfers, incumbent’s total payoff is r   P
i2I
ti if he is reelected, and  P
i2I
ti if he is not.
3.3 Equilibria
We assume that when a media outlet is indifferent between accepting or rejecting an offer, it
will always choose to accept. This assumption is purely to ensure the existence of equilibria.
10We could easily introduce a punishment imposed by the VM to M , when the UV learn through social
media that the incumbent is bad butM chose to suppress this information in exchange for a transfer. Our main
results hold in that case as well.
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Making any offer to an outlet that is strictly greater than its opportunity cost is a strictly
dominated strategy for the incumbent. These ideas are captured in the following lemma:
Proposition 2 Given the level of connectedness, the incumbent must adopt one of the fol-
lowing four strategies:
1. Offer tM = M and tA = A + p()M (capture both)
2. Offer tM = M and tA = 0 (capture M only)
3. Offer tM = 0 and tA = A (capture A only)
4. Offer tM = 0 and tA = 0 (no capture)
Proof. The first strategy leads to the capture of all media outlets where transfers equal to the
expected profits of publishing are made to both M and A. In other words, if M deviates its
product will be consumed by its audience with size M and it will receive a payoff of M
as a result. The incumbent must transfer the equal amount in equilibrium in order to capture
M. If A deviates, its product will be consumed by its audience with size A, and furthermore
with the probability of p() it will also be consumed by the audience of M with size M . A’s
expected payoff from publishing is therefore A+ p()M , and the incumbent must transfer
an equal amount to A to capture it as well.
The second strategy leads to M’s capture, but since tA = 0, A will reject the offer and
publish the bad signal. In fact the incumbent could offer any amount strictly lower than
A+p()M , and the outcome would be the same. But for simplicity of notation we assume
that they offer zero whenever they wish not to capture an outlet.
In the third and fourth strategies M rejects the offers because they are strictly below
the expected payoff of publishing. Since M publishes the signal, the VM will not switch to
A, thus making the expected payoff of publishing A for the alternative outlet. Hence the
incumbent has no incentive to transfer any amount greater than A.
Finally, the incumbent has no incentive to offer an amount greater than M to M and
greater than A + p()M to A in any case.
In equilibrium, when both media outlets are captured the bad incumbent will be reelected
for certain. When only M is captured, the incumbent will be reelected with probability
1  p(). And whenever M is not captured, the bad incumbent will certainly be turned over.
Lemma 3 The expected payoff of the incumbent is then:
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EUInc(tM = M ; tA = A + p()M) = r   M   (A + p()M)
EUInc(tM = M ; tA = 0) = r(1  p())  M
EUInc(tM = 0; tA = A) =  A
EUInc(tM = 0; tA = 0) = 0
Proof. Since the voters can base their votes only on the information they have, and we
have that M > A, the strategy of VM will be decisive on the outcome of the election.
Hence, whenever the mainstream outlet is not captured and publishes the bad signal about
the incumbent, the incumbent will be overturned with certainty. If the incumbent decides
to offer a positive transfer to the alternative outlet nevertheless, and the alternative outlet
accepts the transfer, the incumbent will lose the transfer and receive nothing in return.
If the incumbent chooses to capture both outlets by offering tM = M and tA = A +
p()M , then the media will be captured completely, and the incumbent will be reelected for
sure and receive r M   (A+p()M). Finally, if only the mainstream outlet is captured,
the incumbent will be reelected with probability (1   p()), and therefore their expected
utility is equal to r(1  p())  M :
Clearly, the strategy tM = 0; tA = A is dominated by tM = 0; tA = 0.
Before moving forward to the equilibria of this game let us denote by r1() the critical
value of r at which the incumbent is indifferent between offering tM = M , tA = 0 and
offering tM = 0; tA = 0. In other words, r1() is the level of political rent that leaves
the risk neutral incumbent indifferent between choosing to capture M alone, and capturing
neither outlet, given the value . Formally:
r1() =
M
1  p()
It can easily be seen that r1() is increasing in .
Further denote by r2() the critical value of r at which the incumbent is indifferent be-
tween offering tM = M ; tA = A+p()M and offering tM = M ; tA = 0, when p() > 0.
That is to say when r = r2(), the incumbent will be indifferent between capturing both out-
lets and capturing M alone. Formally:
r2() =
A + p()M
p()
=
A
p()
+ M
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Clearly, r2() is decreasing in . Then:
r1()  r2()() M
1  p() 
A
p()
+ M
Since A = 1  M , we have for all p() 2 (0; 1):
r1()  r2()() M  1  p()
1  p() + p()2
We are finally ready to characterize the equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 4 Given , the following constitutes an equilibrium:
a) Beliefs of voters:
the audience of M believe P ( = g) =
8<: 0 if sM = b^M if sM = ;
the audience of A believe P ( = g) =
8<: 0 if sA = b^A if sA = ;
where ^M   and ^A  :
b) Strategies of Informed Voters:
Informed voters share if  > , and refrain otherwise, where  is the solution to:
 = c
p
(   )

+ 
c) Strategies of Voters:
Audience of M vote for incumbent if sM = ; and sA = ;. If sM = b they vote for the
challenger. If sM = ; and sA = b, and if they are convinced to switch to outlet A, they
observe sA = b and therefore vote for the challenger. Otherwise they vote for the incumbent.
Audience of A vote for the incumbent if sA = ; and vote for the challenger otherwise.
d) Strategies of the Incumbent:
Incumbent offers:
If r < M , then tM = 0 and tA = 0.
If r2()  r1() and
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if r  r2(), then tM = M and tA = A + p()M ,
if r2() > r  r1(), then tM = M and tA = 0,
if r1() > r, then tM = 0 and tA = 0.
If r1() > r2() and
if r  r1(), then tM = M and tA = A + p()M ,
if r1() > r, then tM = 0 and tA = 0.
e) Strategies of the Media Outlets:
For outlet M:
Accept if tM  M ;
Reject otherwise.
For outlet A:
Accept if tA  A + p()M , or if tA  A and tM < M ;
Reject otherwise.
Proof. a) The proof that a voter will believe that the incumbent is good with probability zero
upon receiving the bad signal is trivial, since bad signals are verifiable.
To prove the latter, note that upon receiving no bad signal, every voter will deduce that
incumbent is good with a probability at least as high as . As likelihood of capture decreases
or the probability of information about the incumbent spreading via social media increases,
the expectations regarding the incumbent’s type improve when the signal is empty.
b) This part follows from Proposition 1.
c) We assume that all types of voters use undominated pure strategies. If a voter observes
s = b and therefore deduces that the incumbent is good with probability zero, then the
expected payoff of reelection is also zero, whereas the expected utility when a new challenger
wins the election is fixed at . Therefore a voter who observes s = b strictly prefers the
challenger, and votes against the incumbent.
If a voter observes si = ; for i 2 fM;Ag, she believes that the incumbent is good with
probability ^i  . If ^i is strictly greater than , then the expected utility of voting for the
incumbent is also ^i > , and the voter prefers to vote for the incumbent.
19
We need to show that the voter who observes si = ; will vote for the incumbent when
^i = . Assume for a contradiction that she votes against the incumbent. Then the bad
incumbent has no incentive to pay a transfer to media outlet i, since the readers of i vote
against the incumbent even when the signal si = ;. Therefore the incumbent offers ti = 0
and the outlet i rejects and publishes the bad signal. If bad incumbent never captures outlet
i, then ^i = 1. )(
Therefore when ^i =  it must be that the audience of outlet i vote for the incumbent.
d) Recall as in proposition 2 the incumbent must choose from one of the four strategies
described. Note that the strategy tM = 0; tA = A is dominated by tM = 0; tA = 0. When
only A is captured the audience of M still learn the incumbent’s type, and their votes alone
are enough to overturn the incumbent.
The incumbent will find it optimal not to capture either outlet when r < M , since
in any capture equilibrium it must capture M, and if M is too expensive to capture then
the incumbent is better off not capturing any outlet. Let us now examine the case when
r2()  r1():
If r  r2(), then the incumbent will want to capture both outlets since:
EU Inc(M ; A+p()M) = r   (A+p()M)  M r(1  p())  M= EU Inc(M ; 0)
If r2() > r  r1(), then the incumbent will choose to capture M only, and take the
risk that it will be overturned if the informed voters successfully convince the others about
the type of the incumbent, because:
EU Inc(M ; 0) = r(1  p())  M> r   (A+p()M)  M= EU Inc(M ; (A+p()M))
If r1() > r, then the incumbent will choose not to capture either outlet because he must
pay M to capture, but with the probability p() he will still lose his seat. Therefore his
expected utility from capturing M is:
r(1  p())  M < 0:
In the case when r1() > r2():
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If r  r1(), then the incumbent will want to capture both outlets since:
EU Inc(M ; A+p()M) = r   (A+p()M)  M 0 = EU Inc(0; 0)
And finally, if r1() > r, the incumbent will offer zero to both outlets for the same
reasons as above.
e) The expected payoff of M when it publishes the bad signal is M , so it is weakly
preferred to accept any transfer equal to or greater than that. Any offer that is lower than that
amount will be rejected and the signal published.
The expected payoff of A when it publishes but it is not the only one to do so is A, so it
will accept any offer equal to or greater than that. When A is the only outlet to publish the
bad signal, on the other hand, its expected payoff is (A + p()M), since with probability
p() the informed voters will convince others to switch to A. Therefore, A will accept a
transfer if and only if it is greater than or equal to (A + p()M) when M is captured.
Lower offers will be rejected.
4 Results
First, taking M and r as given, let us examine the effects of  on capture. The payoff of
the incumbent from capturing both and capturing M only decrease as  goes up. The former
happens because A’s opportunity cost of suppressing increases. The latter happens because
the probability of overturn increases when A publishes. Therefore, the set of political rent
levels in which the incumbent finds it optimal to capture the media shrinks. However, since
r2() =
A
p()
+ M goes down as  goes up, the set of r in which capturing both outlets
is preferred grows relative to capturing the mainstream outlet only. In other words, when
r2() > r1() for the marginal incumbent who is indifferent between capturing both and
capturing M only, capturing both becomes strictly preferred as  increases. This is because
as p() approaches one, the decrease in the probability of staying in power for the incum-
bent when he captures M only dominates the increase in the cost of capturing A when both
outlets are captured. Therefore as  goes up, we conjecture that media capture will move
towards either extreme, but decrease in general. That is to say, we expect the press in highly
connected countries to be generally either very independent or completely captured.11 In
contrast, press in countries that are less connected should be on average less independent
11Perhaps very convincing for this finding is the fact that the Freedom House, in the report following the
Gezi Park protests, moved Turkey from the Partly Free category to Not Free.
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and have smaller cross-country variance. Naturally, greater press freedom leads to bad in-
cumbents being identified and overturned more often. Therefore, voter welfare increases as
press freedom goes up.
To see how our findings compare against empirical data, we have examined various
datasets. In the tables below "Penetration" is the 2012 worldwide internet penetration per-
centages data published by International Telecommunication Union. We divided our sample
of 172 countries of which we had balanced data by the median level of internet penetration to
examine how press freedom and voter welfare compare in more connected countries relative
to less connected countries.
>39.325 86             39.0581            23.19653
     <39.325 86             60.1512            17.77541
 Penetration       N(totalpress)    mean(totalpress)      sd(totalpress)
Figure 1: Descriptive statics of press freedom scores of countries with penetration levels above or below the median
value.
The index of press freedom we utilize for our analysis is the Freedom House’s Free-
dom of the Press 2013 (Freedom House, 2013b) report whose ratings cover events that took
place between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2012. This index was first conducted in
1980. Each year every country is given a score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) according to 23
methodology questions and 109 indicators. Countries that have scores between 0 and 30 are
regarded to have Free press; 31 to 60, Partly Free press; and 61 to 100, Not Free press.
Figure 1 shows that if we divide the set of countries into two groups of equal size by
the median level of internet penetration, the countries above this level have an average press
freedom score of 39.1, a score significantly better than the countries with less than me-
dian penetration, which have an average of 60.2. This is in line with our hypothesis that
higher connectedness is correlated with greater press freedom. Furthermore, highly con-
nected countries also have a wider spread with a standard deviation of 23.2, compared with
17.8. This corroborates our theoretical finding that as connectedness goes up press freedom
is likely to go to either extreme.
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Figure 2 below is a histogram showing the frequency of countries in each category ac-
cording to the ratings in the Freedom of the Press 2013 report, for high penetration countries
shown in light grey against low penetration countries shown in dark grey. There are only
five countries out of our sample of 172 that are on the lower than median internet penetra-
tion rate and rated as a country with a Free press. A great majority of the low penetration
countries (81 of out 86) either have a Partly Free or a Not Free press. This contrasts with the
press in high penetration countries, which are mostly Free. In line with our hypothesis, there
are fewer countries with Partly Free press among high penetration countries relative to low
penetration countries.
Figure 2: Number of countries by their press freedom rankings: 0-30 (Free); 31-60 (Partly
Free); 61-100 (Not Free)
The relationship between press freedom and corruption is well documented, (see for
instance Brunetti and Weder, 2003). As a proxy for voter welfare we use a corruption mea-
sure, namely the Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 (Transparency International, 2012),
which aggregates data from a select number of different sources from credible institutions,
including the World Bank, Global Insight and the World Economic Forum. In this index, 0
corresponds to highest possible level of perceived corruption, whereas 100 corresponds to
least possible level of perceived corruption.
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>39.325 86              55.907            18.55144
     <39.325 86             30.7442            10.47258
 Penetration     N(cpi2012score)  mean(cpi2012score)    sd(cpi2012score)
Figure 3: Descriptive statics of corruption scores of countries with penetration levels above or below the median
value.
Figure 3 reveals that in line with our findings in Figures 1 and 2, countries with greater
connectedness are significantly more corruption free in comparison to the countries with low
connectedness. The former group has an average score of 55.9, almost twice as large as the
average of the latter, 30.7. Even more striking is the difference in the standard deviation of
the two groups. High penetration countries have a standard deviation of 18.6, much larger
than the standard deviation of the low penetration countries, which is only 10.5. This sup-
ports the hypothesis that connectedness can serve as a good deterrent against corruption, but
in countries with high political rent, efforts to subvert connectedness despite high levels of
internet penetration may be at least partially successful.
5 Conclusion
Our main contribution to the literature is the study of social media and its relation to press
freedom in a democratic setting. Our model reiterates that press freedom is a significant tool
for political accountability; and suggests that social media, due to its independent nature,
may serve as an invaluable complement to traditional media in this sense.
Information technologies keep on spreading across the globe. This, unfortunately, does
not necessarily mean that we should see press freedom and political accountability improve
everywhere. Governments whose survival depend on the control of information to further
their interests find means to counteract the spread of information, and can sometimes even
reverse this trend. In other words, while internet penetration rate increases in most countries
with a problematic press, connectedness may not show an equivalent rise.This is sometimes
done by direct censor of social media, which is the case in China, Iran, Syria and Pakistan
among others. A more common practice is enacting laws that introduce fines or prison
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sentences to citizens who share political content online, often in the pretense of privacy
of personal information. A relatively new method that is spreading quickly is to hire pro-
government commentators to manipulate online discussions in an effort to counterbalance
the increasing time spent online by citizens. All of these serve to decrease connectedness
among voters despite the overall trend of increasing penetration.
Our results indicate that connectedness is a decent predictor of both press freedom and
corruption. Although far from conclusive, our empirical research supports this hypothesis.
It is not very surprising to see that the introduction of new information technologies hurts
those who depend on lack of information. What is surprising, however, is our novel finding
that in high political rent countries where there is only partial capture in the absence of
social media, proliferation of information technologies may lead to increased suppression
of press freedom. That is because alternative media, complemented by social media, may
offer substantial opposition to the incumbent. Again, empirical evidence does not reject this
hypothesis, an in fact seems to corroborate it.
Our findings highlight the importance of social media and internet freedom as a means to
overcome concealment of information, especially of political nature. To this end, it is crucial
to promote freedom of speech online. Also important is information about internet freedom
across countries. While Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report is commendable, it
includes only 60 countries, a number which fades in comparison to the number of countries
in Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press report, 197.
Further research may focus on endogenizing media capture, in the sense that instead of
assuming that mass media is made up of two distinct groups, the incumbent may choose
what fraction of the market share to capture. Also interesting would be a study of extensions
where the incumbent can take a costly action to interfere with connectedness by hiring pro-
government commentators that spread misinformation online, or by introducing new laws
and regulations that effectively increase the cost of sharing, c. As for the empirical part,
an important research question is how social capital fares with respect to the other critical
variables, particularly press freedom, corruption, and penetration.
Finally, we would like to reiterate that our theoretical findings are robust to a variety of
specifications, some of which can be seen in the appendix.
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6 Appendix
One potential criticism towards the baseline model is our assumption that informed voters
may derive positive benefits from sharing news on social media. In this appendix, we remove
this assumption, and examine a situation where informed voters receive higher utility from
the successful overturn of a bad incumbent, relative to those who refrained from sharing.
This may be the case when citizens who spread the bad signal about the incumbent are
thought to be the proponents of the overturn, and treated as such by a grateful challenger.
We show that with a few technical assumptions, our results hold in this case as well.
As before, the probability that the uninformed voters learn the incumbent’s true type is
given by the function p(; ), which is differentiable and non-decreasing in both  and . In
this extension, we assume that social media acts merely as a catalyst for social interaction,
and it is redundant in a perfectly connected society. In other words, for sufficiently high
values of  we have that p(; 0) = 1. Conversely, in a society where people are extremely
disconnected due to lack of information technologies and want of social capital, we assume
that any attempt to spread information via social media will be in vain. Hence, for sufficiently
low values of  we have that p(; 1) = 0.12
When a portion of the voters is informed that the incumbent is bad, their expected payoff
when the incumbent retains power is zero, whereas overturning the incumbent and electing a
challenger of unknown type has an expected payoff of . Moreover, informed voters receive
higher utility from overturning the incumbent when they actively participated in spreading
information about them. That is to say, in the case that the bad incumbent is overturned
and succeeded by a challenger of unknown type, a voter who shared the news receives the
expected payoff  +  (where  > 0 is the political advantage obtained by voters who were
active in social media), whereas a voter who refrained receives the expected payoff . There-
fore, if an informed voter believes that the incumbent will be overturned with probability
p(; ), his expected payoff from sharing as a function of  and  is:
p(; )( + )  c(1  )  
On the other hand, the expected payoff of an IV who refrains from sharing is:
12The former scenario of a perfectly connected society is only plausible in real life when the society in
question is sufficiently small so that news can spread without any effort on the part of the informed voters. The
other extreme is somewhat more realistic, as according to 2012 statistics many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Southeast Asia have internet penetrations lower than 5%.
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p(; )
Then, the utility of sharing minus the utility of refraining for given values of  and :
p(; )  c(1  )  
Note that if  < , then for any value of  sharing is strictly dominated by refraining.
When this is the case the presence of social media becomes irrelevant and the model is re-
duced to a setting very similar to that of Besley and Prat (2006). Therefore we only examine
the case where  > . In fact to ensure the two-sided limit dominance property standard in
the global game literature, we further restrict our attention to the case when  > c+ . That
is to say, we focus on the setting that when the incumbent is overturned for sure, the utility
of sharing is strictly greater than its cost, even when none of the other informed voters share
the signal. 13
By the assumptions above and by the continuity of p(; ) in , there exists a critical
level of connectedness , such that the following equality holds:
p(; 0) = c+ 
Similarly, denote by ~ the critical level of connectedness that satisfies the following:
p(~; 1) = 
Since p(; ) is non-decreasing in both arguments, it must be that ~  , strictly when
c > 0. Hence, there are three intervals in which we can examine the best responses of the
informed voters:
 When  < ~, refraining is a strictly dominant action for every informed voter, since
the benefit of sharing is always lower than its cost, regardless of the actions of other
IV.
 When ~    , neither strategy is strictly dominant. Hence the equilibrium depends
13 <  < c +  leads to one-sided limit dominance, which is outside the scope of this paper. For an
application of one-sided limit dominance, see De Mesquita (2010).
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on players’ beliefs about both the actual value of connectedness, and what the other
players will do.
 When  < , sharing is a strictly dominant action for every informed voter, since the
benefit of sharing is always greater than its cost, regardless of the actions of other IV.
By iterating the arguments in the baseline model, we get that the equilibrium cutoff 
must satisfy the equality:
p (; (1   (p(   )))) = c (1  (1   (p(   )))) + 
Therefore we have:
p (; (1   (p(   )))) = c (p(   )) + 
This equation means that an increase in the cutoff rule has three effects on the marginal
informed voter whose posterior expectation is exactly equal to the cutoff point. On the right
hand side we see that as the threshold increases, the ratio of informed voters who share the
bad news about the incumbent goes down, which means that the cost of sharing increases.
The other two effects can be seen on the left hand side. First of these is the direct effect which
states that as connectedness goes up, the uninformed voters will have a greater probability
of switching to the informative outlet and receiving the signal that the incumbent is bad. The
second effect on the left hand side is the indirect effect, which says that as the threshold the
informed voters use to decide increases, a lower ratio of informed voters choose to share, and
the probability of the uninformed voters switching goes down. In other words, an increase
in  in the above equation leads to an increase in the right hand side, but the effect on the
left hand side is ambiguous.
To get the single crossing property standard in the global game literature, we assume that
p1   p2p() > c
p


() for all  2 R, where p1 refers to the derivative of p(; )
with respect to the first argument, and p2 refers to the derivative of p(; ) with respect to the
second argument, and  is the probability mass function of the standard normal distribution.
We can rewrite the above inequality as follows:
p1 > (
)
p
[p2 +
c

]
Propositions 1 and 4 can easily be replicated in this setting
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It should be clear that our results in the baseline model do not depend on the particular
payoff structure, and can be accomodated in a wide range of specifications, so long as the
two-sided limit dominance property standard in the global game literature is satisfied.
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